午夜剧场

My specialization is European politics and international relations, with a focus on NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). However, this naturally leads to an interest in alliances outside of NATO. As a Japanese citizen, the Japan-U.S. alliance is a given, but I also cannot take my eyes off other U.S. alliances.

In this context, I had the opportunity to visit Australia last November, despite a grueling lecture tour schedule of three cities in five days. It was a perfect opportunity to observe the U.S.-Australia alliance up close.

Drawing an analogy from U.S.-UK relations, I repeatedly proposed the hypothesis to my counterparts that "for Australia, the alliance with the U.S. is part of its DNA," and not a single person denied it. From our discussions, two points are particularly noteworthy, including the differences with Japan.

First, the seriousness of their criticism of the Trump administration, including from government officials, was impressive. There is a strong sense that "if the U.S. makes a wrong decision, it directly affects Australia, and there is no escape." For Australia, which has participated in almost all U.S. wars, the decisions of the U.S. President are directly linked to their own life and death. The degree of this realistic sensation differs from that in Japan.

Second, regarding the ultimate choice in foreign relations, there is a lively debate in Australia about whether to choose the U.S. or defect to China. However, in reality, in light of history, culture, and language, the possibility of parting ways with the U.S. is nearly zero. Even if they differ with the U.S. on individual policies, when the fate of the nation is at stake, it is highly likely that their identity as Anglo-Saxons plays a major role.

I am not trying to explain international relations through race. Nevertheless, the observation that "it is impossible for the Japan-U.S. relationship to imitate the U.S.-UK relationship" remains persistent. Whether it is the introduction of state-of-the-art fighter jets or constitutional reform, there seems to be something that cannot be overcome. This cannot be ignored.

Personally, I take a realist position that alliances are based on cold calculations of national interest. However, looking at the U.S.-Australia alliance as described above, one cannot deny the validity of constructivism, which emphasizes ideas and identity.

Diplomacy like that of 18th or 19th-century Europe, where alliances were flexibly rearranged according to changes in national interest, is difficult in today's world. It would be ironic if the destination of the 21st century is a return to "DNA alliances," but that is precisely why this field has a human element and remains endlessly fascinating.