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Return from the South: Internment and Demobilization of Japanese Soldiers

Publish: November 11, 2019

Writer Profile

  • Hiroshi Masuda

    Other : Professor Emeritus, Rissho University

    ÎçÒ¹¾ç³¡ alumni

    Hiroshi Masuda

    Other : Professor Emeritus, Rissho University

    ÎçÒ¹¾ç³¡ alumni

Internment and demobilization are the ultimate dramas of the losers of war. Proof is better than theory. There is an isolated island off the coast of Singapore called Rempang Island. Approximately 80,000 Japanese prisoners of war were sent to this island. Escape was impossible without a ship, so no guards were needed, and if Japanese soldiers died, no one would know. It was a convenient natural concentration camp that killed three birds with one stone. After the Japanese soldiers ate all the young tree buds, snakes, rats, and grasshoppers within a week, the number of patients suffering from malaria, amoebic dysentery, and beriberi reached 30,000. It was only when this crisis was reached that the British army finally extended a helping hand.

Furthermore, Japanese soldiers had to clear themselves of war crime suspicions, and were forced to step forward one by one in front of local women who had been victimized for a "line-up." If a woman testified, "It's this man," it was the end; they were imprisoned and given the death penalty. Formal trials were only a small fraction of the cases.

On the other hand, there were differences in how the Allied powers handled Japanese prisoners. Mountbatten of the British Army ignored the early repatriation of Japanese soldiers stipulated in the Potsdam Declaration and made maximum use of Japanese labor for local reconstruction. He did not recognize the Japanese as "Prisoners of War (POW)" under the Geneva Convention, but instead regarded them as "Japanese Surrendered Personnel (JSP)" and forced them into unpaid labor. The Dutch military followed suit.

In response, MacArthur of the US military strongly demanded that the British and Dutch forces comply with international regulations, pushing for early demobilization and the payment of wages to prisoners. This was also because, under the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, he feared that Britain and the Netherlands would become a "second Soviet Union." Prime Minister Yoshida also pleaded for the demobilization of Japanese people by borrowing MacArthur's authority. Eventually, with the support of international public opinion, the British and Dutch sides agreed to complete demobilization and pay wages. However, while they calculated the wages, they forced the Japanese government to bear the burden of the payments themselves. British diplomacy was cunning to the very end.

Nevertheless, under these poor conditions, the Japanese officers and soldiers learned many lessons. The occupation administration of Southeast Asia was largely a failure, and they were forced to realize the flaws in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere concept. By coming into contact with the rich humanity and material civilization of the Americans, whom they had viewed as enemies ("Brutal Americans and British"), the Japanese were able to see themselves in a relative light. A sense of self-reflection was also born regarding the importance of science and technology, the authoritarian nature of the military, and the national character of the Japanese people which changed suddenly after the defeat.

Have these lessons learned by the Japanese truly become the flesh and blood of today's Japanese society?

Hiroshi Masuda

ÎçÒ¹¾ç³¡ Press

272 pages, 2,700 yen (excluding tax)

*Affiliations and titles are those at the time of publication.