午夜剧场

My specialization is Japanese legal history (a somewhat niche field within jurisprudence?), and I focus my research particularly on Kamakura Shogunate law, such as the Goseibai Shikimoku. Influenced by Takeyoshi Kawashima's "The Legal Consciousness of the Japanese" (Iwanami Shinsho, 1967), which I read during my undergraduate years, I became interested in the "gap" that exists between modern statutory laws inherited from the West during the Meiji period and the consciousness of citizens. My motivation for choosing this field was a desire to examine the true nature of that "gap" from a historical perspective.

Something I have always been conscious of in my research is the significance of legal history research within jurisprudence. The reason I felt I wanted to (and should) confront that simple yet difficult question was because I was greatly inspired by the symposium "The Meaning of Historical Thinking in Jurisprudence" (Legal History Review, No. 51, 2001) held by the Japan Legal History Association in 2000. In the discussions among prominent legal scholars regarding the "meaning of historical thinking," particularly in relation to positive law, I felt as though I was being confronted with the idea that the discipline of legal history has an "accountability" for its meaning within jurisprudence as a whole, and that researchers must objectify and "reflect" on the discipline itself.

Hoping to find clues to fulfill this "accountability," I have continued two things to this day. One is (in addition to research on Kamakura Shogunate law) researching the history of legal history as a discipline itself. What significance did "historical thinking" have during the Meiji and Taisho periods when modern jurisprudence entered Japan, and how has it transitioned to the present? I think of this research as a journey of going around and asking predecessors in jurisprudence, including legal historians, "How was it in your time?"

The other is conducting joint research with researchers from different fields who emphasize "historical thinking" from their respective perspectives and interests. Through this (though this may be more about the behavior of legal historians than the "meaning of historical thinking"), I have come to believe that legal history researchers should be more like "historians" toward researchers of positive law, and more like "legal scholars" toward researchers in other fields. I intend to continue the endeavor of re-examining the "meaning of historical thinking in jurisprudence."